INTRODUCTION
In this paper, it is shown that any zero-sum game of perfect information with n outcomes is solvable by n-1 iterations of eliminating weakly dominated strategies -regardless of the length of the game.
The intuition is as follows. Suppose that player i's maximum possible payoff is u i max .
Then, if i has a strategy ensuring u i max , this strategy is dominant and the game solves in one step. On the other hand, if i has no such "winning" strategy, then on any path that leads to u i max , player j must take a "surrendering" move at some decision node that allows i to ensure u i max in the ensuing subgame. As ensuring u i max is the sole undominated strategy for i in the subgame, it turns out that any strategy by j that may entail a surrendering move is eliminated by two steps of eliminating weakly dominated strategies. Hence, after two steps of elimination, it is no longer feasible to reach any terminal node with payoff u i max . Since the same is true for player j's maximum possible payoff u j max , the first two steps of elimination must delete the two extreme outcomes in the game (unless either i or j had a winning strategy).
This argument can be iterated in a straightforward way. Specifically, when the number of outcomes n is odd, i.e., equal to 2m+1 for some m, then one needs at most 2m=n-1 steps to arrive at a trivial game. When n is even, i.e., equal to 2m for some m, then the game has at most two outcomes left after 2(m-1) steps of elimination, so the game solves in at most 2(m-1)+1=n-1 steps. Thus, in both cases, n-1 steps are sufficient.
The application of iterated weak dominance to games of perfect information has been studied before. In [5] , Gale suggests an equilibrium selection procedure in finite perfectinformation games using iterated dominance arguments. A key contribution is [9] , in which
Moulin formulates a condition on perfect-information games implying dominance-solvability, i.e., that the iterated elimination of all weakly dominated strategies yields a game in which all strategy combinations induce the same outcome. The proof uses the fact that backward induction reasoning eliminates weakly dominated strategies in every step, though not necessarily all of them. The condition formulated by Moulin guarantees that b ackward induction yields a singleton outcome, but also that the order of elimination does not matter, implying that iterated weak dominance leads to the same unique outcome as backward induction. In [6] , Gretlein discovers a gap in Moulin's proof and closes it using results of a companion paper [7] . A frequently cited unpublished working paper [13] by Rochet seems to contain results similar to those in [7] (see [4] and [11] ). The careful reader of this literature will notice that in [10] , Moulin attributes the above-mentioned result in [9] to Harold Kuhn.
The present paper builds upon and extends the main result in [3] , which says that any zerosum perfect-information game with three outcomes is solvable in two steps. 2 The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 recalls some standard terminology. In Section 3, we present the concept of a surrender strategy and apply it to derive the main result. The tightness of the upper bound is shown in Section 4. The appendix contains technical proofs.
NOTATION
Consider a finite perfect-information game G (for definitions of the standard concepts used, we refer the reader to Binmore [2] i specifies moves at any node x∈X i . Denote a typical strategy for j by t, and the set of strategies for players i and j by S and T, respectively. We say that s∈S reaches x if there is a t∈T such that the path generated by the profile (s,t) contains x. The utility of player i is
, where z is the terminal node contained in the path generated by (s,t).
Throughout the paper, we assume that G is zero-sum, i.e. that u i (s,t)=-u j (s,t) for all s and t. In the present context, this is tantamount to saying that the game is strictly competitive,
i.e. that the elements of the set of outcomes {(u i (s,t),u j (s,t))|s∈S, t∈T} can be labeled as a 1 ,...,a n so that player i prefers an outcome with lower index over an outcome with higher index, and vice versa for player j. 
For any normal-form game N with utility u i (s,t), denote by v i (N)= max s min t u i (s,t) player i's value or security level in N. Write N=N(G) for the normal form of G, and v i (G):= v i (N(G)). It is well known ([8,15]) that v i (G)=-v j (G)
.
SURRENDER STRATEGIES
The main result of the paper says that any zero-sum perfect-information game G with n outcomes is dominance solvable in n-1 steps. For an example, consider Figure 1 . Here, a one-time elimination of weakly dominated strategies reduces G to G'. While this simplifies the game, the reader will also notice that the number of outcomes remains unchanged at three.
It is therefore not possible to employ a direct induction argument on the number of outcomes.
However, note that an additional step of elimination applied to G' renders a game with just one outcome.
It turns out that this is true in general. More precisely, it will be shown below that, in all relevant cases, two steps of elimination reduce the number of outcomes by at least two. In fact, two steps of eliminating dominated strategies delete "extreme" outcomes, characterized
by the property that they give either player 1 or player 2 her most preferred payoff. This is why the following definition is of interest. Assume that player j does not possess a winning strategy in N. Then a surrender strategy for player i in N is a strategy s with the property that there exists a strategy t for player j such that u j (s,t) is the maximum possible utility for j in N.
- Figure 1 here -Consider again the example depicted in Figure 1 . The mechanics for this result were explained in the introduction (the proof can be found in the appendix). Roughly speaking, the first step of elimination deletes all non-winning strategies for j in subgames where j possesses a winning strategy. Then, the second step deletes all strategies for i which enable j to reach one of these subgames, i.e., the second step deletes all surrender strategies. Given these preparations, the upper bound can be derived as follows. When no player has a winning strategy, the elimination of surrender strategies reduces the number of outcomes by two. Hence, a fortiori, the two-fold elimination of dominated strategies also reduces the number of outcomes by two. Iterating this argument yields our main result.
Lemma 2. Let G be a zero-sum game of perfect information, and k≥0. Assume that D k (N) possesses only two outcomes. Then D k+1 (N) is trivial.

Proof. By Lemma A.2 in the Appendix, the minmax theorem for PI games is valid also for the game D k (N) (which is not necessarily of perfect information). That is, we have
v i (D k (N))+ v j (D k (N))=0. As v i (D k (N)) can
Theorem 1. Let G be a strictly competitive perfect-information game with n outcomes. Then n-1 iterations of eliminating weakly dominated strategies reduce G to a trivial game.
Proof. The assertion follows by induction from Lemma 1 if n is odd. If n is even, apply
Lemma 1 (n-1)/2 times, and apply Lemma 2 afterwards. ¶
The proof of this result (especially that of Lemma 1) is more complicated than in the case n=3 mainly because of two reasons. Firstly, two steps of elimination will typically delete not only surrender strategies, but other strategies as well. This makes it difficult to use a more direct induction argument. The second complication is that the elimination of weakly dominated strategies in a game of perfect information does not necessarily render a perfect information game (see [1] for an example), which also precludes the use of a simpler induction argument.
TIGHTNESS OF THE UPPER BOUND
For a general finite strictly competitive perfect-information game with n outcomes, it does not suffice to perform less than n-1 steps of elimination. An example is G n in Figure 2 , which is a variant of Rosenthal's centipede game (see [12] ). The outcomes are a 1 ,...,a n , where player 1 prefers an outcome with lower index over an outcome with higher index, and vice versa for player 2. Consider first the case that n is even (left side of Figure 2 ). We claim that for player 1, only the strategy s 0 that goes straight through to the outcome a n is weakly dominated, and that for player 2, no strategy is dominated. To see why, note that in order to determine the payoff of a strategy pair, it suffices to distinguish between strategies in terms of the first "exit point". Then, if a strategy s' exhibits a performance against some strategy t that is strictly different from that of another strategy s (which is a necessary condition for a weak dominance relationship), then this means that the exit point of t is either between or behind those of s and s'. However, if this is the case, then the superiority relation between s and s' is reversed when the exit point of t is moved, either from "between" to "behind," or vice versa. This is always possible unless either s or s' does not exit at all, i.e., is equal to s 0 . An analogous argument applies when n is odd. It follows that, by identifying certain payoff-equivalent strategies, we Proof. By Lemma A.1,
As N is the normal form of a perfect information game, the minmax theorem implies
Thus, from (i),
On the other hand, clearly v i (D k (T) . This proves the assertion. ¶
